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Abstract
We study the impact of exogenous variation in Italian municipal elections
voter turnout rates on city performance scores and elected mayors indicators
of valence. First, we build a simple model of voluntary and costly expressive
voting, where the relative weight of ideology and valence issues over voting costs
determines how people vote, and if they actually turn out to vote. We show that
the cost of voting depresses voter turnout, yet can raise the chances of selecting
higher valence candidates and thereby improve government performance. Em-
pirically, city performance is measured along a number of dimensions including
a unique index of overall urban environmental quality, and mayorsvalence is
proxied by variables reecting their professional experience and competence.
The staggered nature of the municipal election schedule allows us to exploit
exogenous variation in voter turnout rates through the 2000s due to the pres-
ence of concomitant regional, general and European parliament elections, and
to weather conditions (rainfall) on the election day. The results from a number
of specications and quality of policy-making indicators consistently point to
a negative impact of voter turnout rates on the performance of cities and the
valence of mayors.
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1 Introduction
Low and declining voter turnout rates across the Western democracies have
been a cause of concern for political observers and academics alike for decades
(Reif and Shmitt, 1980; Boyd, 1981). The idea that massive vote abstention
poses a threat on the nature of the democratic process, possibly altering the
representation of interests of the diverse segments of society due to systematic
di¤erences in preferences for public policy between voters and nonvoters, seems
to call for institutional remedies and registration/voting mechanisms aimed at
boosting votersparticipation (Lijphart, 1997).
However, the premise that high or nearly universal rates of voter participa-
tion are desirable, and that variation in turnout might have signicant policy
consequences, does not seem to be so rmly grounded either in theoretical or
in empirical research. From a theoretical point of view, Borgers (2004) showed
that if voting is costly and instrumentally motivated, and voters have private
values (own ideological views) over candidatesposition issues, turnout tends to
be ine¢ ciently high due to the fact that each voter ignores the negative piv-
otal externality he inicts on the other voters when deciding to vote. Krasa
and Polborn (2009) extended Borgers analysis to larger electorates and asym-
metric groups: they identied a counteracting positive externality that voters
from a group generate on abstainers from the same group, and stated the con-
ditions under which mandatory voting policies can be benecial. Within a
framework where voters have both private values and commonly shared values,
Ghosal and Lockwood (2009) further proved that low voter turnout resulting
from an information-driven switch from private value (ideological) to common
value (candidatescompetence) voting might lead to better selection of agents,
and be welfare increasing. Finally, Aldashev (2008) modelled the e¤ect of the
level of voter turnout on political rent accumulation in an expressive voting
framework, and showed that lower turnout due to higher ideological mobility of
voters actually reduces equilibrium rents by self-interested politicians, and can
therefore increase welfare.
Indeed, most of the strength of the get out the votearguments arises from
models where voters are heterogeneous, with wealthy and aged individuals vot-
ing in larger proportions than younger and less fortunate ones. This renders the
redistributive content of public policy crucially dependent on the share, com-
position and skewness of the electorate that actually cast their votes. In fact,
a number of recent empirical ndings suggest that raising voter turnout tends
to help progressive candidates, favor minority and disadvantaged groups, lead
to more redistribution and welfare (pension and education) spending, and in
the end contribute to ll the democratic decitof poor participation contests
(Fowler, 2013; Rauh, 2014; Leon, 2013). Overall, though, the empirical evidence
is mixed: even when the focus of the inquiry is on the degree of pure redistrib-
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ution that can be obtained in a representative democracy system, some pieces
of empirical research challenge the low turnout-poor democracy postulate, and
question the desirability, or even the relevance, of an increase in voter turnout
per se (Lutz and Marsh, 2007).
Mueller and Stratmann (2003) investigate the voter participation-demand
for redistribution nexus, and nd that higher turnout is accompanied by the
implementation of policies that actually retard growth. Relatedly, Fumagalli
and Narciso (2012) regard voter turnout as the underlying link between demo-
cratic institutions and country performance, and show that institutions that
are typically accompanied by higher voter turnout (parliamentary regimes and
proportional voting rules) also tend to be associated with higher redistributive
spending that lowers economic growth rates. Citrin et al. (2003) assessed the
partisan impact of higher turnout in Senate elections using US state-level exit
polls and Census data to simulate the outcome of those elections under universal
turnout. They concluded that while nonvoters are generally more likely to be
Democratic than voters, very few election outcomes would have changed had
everyone voted. Based on data from European election studies in 1989, 1994,
1999 and 2004, van der Eijk and van Egmond (2007) estimated that turnout
size e¤ects on parties shares of the vote in national elections were generally
small (with right-wing parties beneting only slightly from low turnout) and
happened to be decisive in only few cases. Rosema (2007) similarly concludes
that, since the political sophistication of those who participate is relatively high,
the typically more informed choices of those voters tend to counterbalance the
imperfect representation e¤ect due to low participation, which implies that low
turnout might, in fact, improve the selection property of elections. Lutz (2007)
argues that the level of information held by voters matters signicantly more
for the outcome of a popular (direct democracy) vote than does the level of
turnout in itself, while Fisher (2007) disputes the existence of a causal e¤ect
of turnout on the left share of the vote in national elections across countries.
Finally, Ferwerda (2014) exploits the gradual repeal of compulsory voting in
Austria to isolate the causal e¤ect of turnout decline on party vote share shifts,
and nds a generally insignicant turnout e¤ect in spite of large, two-digit rate
declines in voter participation.
Notwithstanding the signicantly larger attention devoted by the scholarly
literature to the trajectory of voter turnout in parliamentary and presidential
elections than in local elections (Wattenberg, 2002), the most recent years have
witnessed growing academic attention towards the analysis of the impact of
voter turnout on policy-making in decentralized government structures. Thanks
to the increasing role of cities in terms of contribution to economic growth,
business attraction and pressure on the environment, democratic participation
in municipal elections in urban areas seems no less important in principle than in
nationwide contests: the larger the degree of political and scal decentralization,
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the more the pattern of participation in local elections might have an impact on
the level and mix of locally provided public services and ultimately on peoples
welfare. In particular, in a low participation environment local communities
might be more vulnerable to capture by interest groups having the most to gain
and ending up with a disproportionately large representation of their own stakes
(Berry, 2009).
Systematic empirical investigations in this sense, though, have been rare,
due to the lack or sparsity of detailed information on local elections. Hajnal
and Trounstine (2005) were among the rst to o¤er credible evidence that the
less regular voting participation of Latinos and Asian American citizens leads
to their systematic under-representation on US city governing bodies, and that
moving the dates of local elections to coincide with more salient national contests
would substantially moderate such phenomenon. By analyzing school district
elections in a number of US states and exploiting the exogenous timing of elec-
tion schedules, Anzia (2011, 2012) nds that low turnout (o¤-cycle) elections
create a strategic opportunity for organized groups (public sector unions) to pur-
sue their private interests (raising public sector salaries). Aggeborn (2013) uses
a constitutional change in Sweden in 1970 as an instrument for voter turnout in
Swedish local elections, and nds that higher voter turnout yields higher munic-
ipal taxes, larger local public expenditures, and lower vote shares for right-wing
parties. Geys et al. (2010) nd larger turnout rates as well as the presence of
non-ideological voter unions in German municipal elections to be associated
with higher e¢ ciency in the provision of local public services. Using data on
Italian municipal elections, De Benedetto and De Paola (2014) apply a fuzzy
regression discontinuity design to show that an exogenous increase in the qual-
ity of candidates to the o¢ ce of mayor due to a higher wage has a positive
e¤ect on electoral participation. Revelli (2013) examines the degree to which
decentralization institutions a¤ect the stakes of local elections, and shows that
deemphasization of position issues in local elections due to scal centralization
(in terms of state-imposed tax limits on local authorities) tends in fact to favor
votersparty line crossing and, while lowering turnout in local elections, raise
the quality and accountability of elected o¢ cials. Bordignon et al. (2014) study
the e¤ect of decentralization reforms on the selection of politicians and nd that
in cities with a larger share of autonomous resources the quality of the political
class is higher.
This paper aims at adding to the existing literature by investigating whether
exogenous changes in the cost of voting a¤ect the degree of voter turnout in mu-
nicipal elections, and whether those turnout changes eventually have an impact
on the quality of urban decision-making and on the performance of cities. The
analysis uses data on large Italian cities through the 2000s, and is based on a
theoretical model where institutions determine how people vote (i.e., either ac-
cording to candidatesideological views or to their valence), and circumstances
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(the cost of voting) determine if they actually turn out to vote. It is on the
latter aspect that we focus, and exploit exogenous shocks to voter turnout - the
presence of concomitant elections for higher levels of government, and weather
variation over election times within a given spatial unit (Dell et al., 2014) -
to estimate its consequences on Italian citiesperformances and elected mayors
traits. The staggered nature of the municipal election schedule and the availabil-
ity of two consecutive elections for each municipality over the 2001-2010 decade
allow us to control for year-specic nationwide inuences on local elections, as
well as for time-invariant local attitudes towards voting. The results from a
number of specications and quality of policy-making indicators consistently
point to a negative causal impact of voter turnout rates on the performance
of cities and on the indicators of valence of elected mayors, suggesting that a
switch from low to high voter turnout might not always be benecial.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section develops
a simple theoretical framework to highlight the impact of the cost of voting
on voter turnout and candidate selection, and derives a number of testable
predictions. Section 3 sets up the empirical strategy, and discusses the two
sources of exogenous variation in voter turnout that we exploit and the indicators
of city performance that we use. Section 4 presents the estimation results, and
section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical framework
Let two candidates (l; r) run for mayoral o¢ ce in city n (n = 1; :::; N). The
candidate securing the majority of the votes of the citys electorate in a winner-
takes-allrace sets the one-dimensional policy x, x 2 fl; rg, for the subsequent
term of o¢ ce based on his ideology - say, a high versus a low local income tax
rate, or large versus small expenditures on local public education. There is no
uncertainty about the policy that candidate x will set if elected. The ideology
of candidates is common knowledge.1
Voting is voluntary, costly, and driven by two expressive motives (Hamlin and
Jennings, 2011): a private value or position issue motive (candidates ideology
determining the policy x) and a common value motive (candidates valence).2
1We abstract entirely here from the issue of how the policy is determined, and assume it
is exogenously xed, as is plausibly the case in a strict party discipline environment. An-
solabehere and Snyder (2000), Kartik and McAfee (2007) and Bernhard, Camara and Squin-
tani (2011) analyze how candidatespersonal traits a¤ect their positioning on the ideological
spectrum.
2This is similar to Ghosal and Lockwood (2009), though in their model voting is instru-
mental and takes place either according to votersprivate preferences or to noisy signals about
candidates competence, while in Krishna and Morgan (2011) the former always dominates
the latter. Aldashev (2008) relies on the hypothesis of expressive voting. In his model, citi-
zens are either ideologically motivated or neutral, and both care about the performance (rent
extraction) of politicians.
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As far as the former is concerned, voter j in city n is ideologically attached to
candidate x with probability 0:5, meaning that no candidate enjoys a systematic
ideological bias in his favor. Valence is instead a commonly valued issue linked
to imperfectly observed candidates inner characteristics, e.g., competence or
probity (Besley, 2005). No instrumental motive is foreseen in votersdecision
to cast a vote due to the fact that the electorate is large enough to make the
chance of a single vote being decisive in a mayoral election negligible.
Votersbehavior in the wake of an election call can be interpreted as con-
sisting of two stages (Ghosal and Lockwood, 2009). First, the relative weight of
ideology and valence issues determines whether, conditional on turning out to
vote, individuals vote according to ideology or valence. Second, the comparison
of the expressive benets of voting with the actual costs of voting determines
whether people actually turn out to vote.
2.1 Ideology versus valence voting
Consider the private value (ideology) versus common value (valence) voting
decision rst. Each voter j has a set of beliefs fj ; jg, with j 2 fl; rg be-
ing the ideological attachment to either of the candidates policies reecting
identication with his view of the world, and j 2 fl; rg being voter js be-
lief about candidatesvalence. Assume that candidate x is valent in state of
the world sx 2 sl; sr	, with the two states of the world being equally likely
ex ante, and that voter j receives a signal j before the election such that
Pr(j = xjs = sx) = q > 0:5. The valence signal may or may not match a
voters ideological preference j . Based on their sets of beliefs, voters can be
categorized as follows.
Denition 1 Voter j is said to be ideological if the expressive benet of voting
by ideology is larger than the expressive benet of voting by valence. Conditional
on turning out, (s)he votes according to j irrespective of j.
Denition 2 Voter j is said to be pragmatic if the expressive benet of voting
by valence is larger than the expressive benet of voting by ideology. Conditional
on turning out, (s)he votes according to j irrespective of j.
Conditional on turning out to vote, ideological voters systematically ignore
the candidatesvalence signals they receive, and blindly stick to their ideology.
Pragmatic voters are instead willing to cross party lines (Casey, 2012), and
vote for the candidate they believe to be the most suited to the state of the
world that the signal suggests to be the most likely.
2.2 Turnout
Consider the turnout decision next. Based on the comparison between the
expressive benets and the costs of voting, the net benet of turning out to
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vote (ej) is:
ej =
8<: [ij + vj ]  cj
max fij ; vjg   cj
if
j = j
j 6= j
(1)
where i is the expressive benet of voting by ideology, v is the expressive benet
of voting for the candidate that is believed to be valent, and c is the cost of
voting. A voter turns out to vote (tj = 1) if the net benet is positive:
tj = 1(ej > 0) (2)
According to equation (1), voters are more likely to turn out if the valence
signals match their ideological views (j = j) than in the case of clash between
valence signal and own ideology (j 6= j). We hypothesize that: vj = V +
"j , where V is a positive parameter, and " is independently and uniformly
distributed on [ ; ], with 0    V . We further assume that the common
value (valence) issue is orthogonal to ideology: E ["ji] = 0. As for ideology, i is
assumed to be independently and uniformly distributed on [0; I], with I > V ,
and cumulative distribution function  = iI . As discussed below, the voting
cost cj is allowed to be correlated across voters due to the fact that individuals
residing in a jurisdiction face the same or similar environmental conditions and
institutional framework.
Figure 1 o¤ers a graphical representation of the forces determining how peo-
ple vote, and whether they turn out to vote. Voters are rst ordered according
to the relevance of the private value issue i to them, with  on the horizontal
axis indexing voterscumulative distribution function.3 For simplicity, assume
that the valence benet vj is constant across voters ( = 0), and that I > 2V ,
implying that the majority of voters are ideological.4 The former hypothesis is
more restrictive than is actually needed, but it greatly simplies the analysis
that follows.5
Figure 1 rst depicts how people vote based on the size of the ideological
expressive benet i (the straight line from the origin of the axes) relative to the
valence-related expressive benet v (the horizontal line at V ). The fraction of
voters  = VI in gure 1 have ij < V and vote pragmatically, i.e., according to
the valence signal they receive, while the fraction 1  VI have ij > V , and vote
ideologically, irrespective of the valence signal.
3The actual shape and position of the cumulative distribution of the expressive ideological
value of voting is likely to vary depending on the institutions governing the local government
structure. In particular, the higher the degree of political and scal decentralization, the
higher the ideological value of voting (Revelli, 2013). In this paper, we take decentralization
institutions as exogenously xed, and focus on the role of circumstances determining the cost
of voting.
4 I = 2V implies that exactly half the electorate is ideological and half is pragmatic. All
graphs in this section are drawn by setting: V = 3; I = 8; q = 0:7.
5 In fact, it is less restrictive than is done in most existing literature, e.g. Krishna and Mor-
gan (2011), where ideology always dominates valence, or Börgers (2004), Krasa and Polborn
(2009) and Taylor and Yildirim (2010), where the valence voting motive is absent.
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As for the turnout decision (equations (1) and (2)), voters for whom the
valence signal matches their ideological views have benets from turning out to
vote as given by the solid straight line m (i + v) in gure 1, while no match
voters - for whom valence signals are clashing with ideological views - have
benets described by the solid piecewise linear curve nm (max fi; vg).
Say that the cost of voting is homogeneous across voters at cj = c > 0.
According to equations (1) and (2), all voters for whom the benets from voting
(m or nm) exceed c will turn out, while the others will abstain.
Figure 1 Ideology and valence in voting
V
V+I
V/I 1
I
g
h
F
2V
v
i
i+v
m
nm
0
nm
c
e
Figure 2 depicts how pragmatic votersturnout, ideological votersturnout,
and total turnout measured on the vertical axis respond to changes in the cost
of voting. First, the e¤ect of the cost of voting on pragmatic votersturnout
t(v) expressed as a percentage of the total electorate is:
t(v) =
8>>>><>>>>:
V
I c < V
V
I   c2I if V < c < 2V
0 c > 2V
(3)
As gure 1 shows, all pragmatic voters
 
V
I

turn out when c < V , while none
of them participates when c > 2V even if the signal matches their ideological
views. For V < c < 2V , the only pragmatic voters that turn out are those for
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whom the valence signal matches their ideological views (i.e., are on line m),
and the total expressive benets from voting strictly exceed costs: ij + V > c.
Given that
 
c
I   VI

voters have ij + V < c and

V
I  
 
c
I   VI

have ij + V >
c, and since the electorate is equally split among the two candidates along
ideological lines, the proportion of pragmatic voters turning out for V < c < 2V
is 12
 
2V
I   cI

= VI   c2I .
Figure 2 Turnout
c
t
t(v)
I
t(i)
t
1
V 2V0 V+I
On the other hand, ideological votersturnout t(i) declines with the cost of
voting according to:
t(i) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>:
1  VI c < V
1  V2I   c2I V < c < 2V
1 + V2I   cI if 2V < c < I
1
2 +
V
2I   c2I I < c < V + I
0 c > V + I
(4)
9
By the same line of reasoning as for pragmatic voters, and as gure 1 shows,
all ideological voters
 
1  VI

turn out for c < V , while a fraction 12
 
c
I   VI

of
them - i.e., those for which the valence signal does not match their ideological
stance (line nm) and ij < c - abstain if V < c < 2V . For c > 2V , some of the
matchideological voters abstain too (those that are located close to VI on line
m in gure 1, and for whom ij +V < c). As the cost of voting further increases
(c > I), the only voters participating in the election have a valence signal
coinciding with their (intense) ideological views. Finally, ideological voters
turnout falls to zero for c > V + I.
As a result of equations (3) and (4), total turnout (t in gure 2) is:
t =
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
1 c < V
1 + V2I   cI V < c < I
if
1
2 +
V
2I   c2I I < c < V + I
0 c > V + I
(5)
Based on the above turnout trajectory, consider now how the cost of voting
a¤ects the probability that, given the state of the world that is realized, the
valent candidate is elected, call it P (v). Let t(i)m and t(i)nm denote the turnout
rates of ideological voters when the signal matches (the candidate they vote for
is valent with probability q) or does not match their ideological views (the
candidate they vote for is valent with probability 1   q) respectively. Given
that pragmatic voters turn out at the rate t(v) - equation (3) - and always
vote correctlyaccording to their valence signals, the probability of electing the
valent candidate is:
P (v) =
[t(v) + t(i)m] q + t(i)nm(1  q)
t
(6)
=
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:

V
I +
1
2
 
1  VI

q + 12
 
1  VI

(1  q) c < V
1
2
V
I q+
1
2 (1 
c
I )
1
2
V
I +(1 
c
I )
if V < c < I
q c > I
Figure 3 draws the probability (6) as a function of the cost of voting. First,
P (v) expectedly falls as soon as the cost of voting surpasses V due to the fact
that pragmatic voters for whom the signal collides with their (weak) ideological
stances (corresponding to horizontal segment V g in gure 1) abstain, so that
good votersare lost to the democratic process because of the rise in the cost of
voting. This result is compatible with the widely held view, recently formalized
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by Aldashev (2008), that a decline in turnout might worsen the quality of the
democratic process and lead to the selection of less valent candidates.
Figure 3 Candidate valence and the cost of voting
c
P(v)
V I
q
0.5
For c > V , though, the probability of electing the valent candidate increases
with c. This is due to the fact that, as c rises, the share of voters casting
their votes according to the correct signal increases relative to the share of
ideological voters blindly voting against their signals. P (v) keeps on increasing
until cost I is reached, where only ideological voters for whom the valence signal
matches their ideological views (corresponding to segment h[V + I] in gure 1)
turn out to vote. At c  I in gure 3, all those who turn out vote according
to their valence signal, and P (v) equals q. It is easily veried that P (v) at
c < V (where, as gure 2 shows, total turnout is 100%) is strictly lower than q
if q > 0:5 (the signal is informative). Consequently, the probability of electing
the valent candidate is maximized when the voting cost is at least as large
as I. Somewhat unexpectedly, maximization of the chances of electing a valent
candidate requires both pragmatic voters - i.e., those who always vote according
to valence - and ideological voters whose signal does not match their ideological
views to abstain, and only the subgroup of radical voters for whom the common
value signal matches their private value views to show up at the polls.
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3 Empirical analysis
The model in section 2 delivers predictions in terms of the impact of the cost of
voting on turnout and election outcomes. This section rst sets up the empirical
model and the estimation approach to be applied onto data of a longitudinal
nature. Next, it discusses the two sources of turnout variation arising from
shocks to the cost of voting that we exploit in the empirical analysis. Finally,
it illustrates the dataset.
3.1 Econometric strategy
Let vnyn be an indicator of valence (competence or probity) of the mayor of
city n = 1; :::; N , with yn denoting the mayors vintage (year the mayor was
elected). At any point in time, the mayors vintage yn varies across cities due
to the presence of a staggered election schedule. In particular, the mayor in
o¢ ce in city n in a given year y was elected at time yn = y   4yn, where
1  4yn < 4y, and 4y is the statutory length of the term of o¢ ce. At the
election held at time yn, turnout tnyn was observed in city n.
Following the theoretical model in section 2, equation (7) below allows the
valence indicator vnyn to be a function of the turnout rate that was registered
in the year yn election. Moreover, equation (7) includes time-invariant charac-
teristics of the locality (fn) and time-varying unobservables "ny, both of which
might in principle be correlated with tnyn :
vnyn = v(tnyn) + fn + "nyn (7)
First, given that E("nyjtnyn) 6= 0 if, say, expectations about mayors va-
lence inuence the rate of turnout, we need to exploit exogenous circumstances
(cost of voting indicators, c) that plausibly a¤ect turnout and are orthogonal
to "ny, and use cnyn as instruments for tnyn based on E("nyjcnyn) = 0. On the
other hand, citys time-invariant characteristics (e.g., social capital) that might
be systematically correlated with turnout are eliminated by rst-di¤erencing
equation (7):
4vnyn = 4v(tnyn) +4"nyn (8)
where: 4vnyn = vnyn   vny0n and 4v(tnyn) = v(tnyn)   v(tny0n), with y0n =
yn  4y. Estimating equation (8) requires using information on the valence of
mayors during the previous term of o¢ ce and on the level of turnout that was
registered when the previous term mayor was elected.
Consider now the case where vnyn is not directly observed, but a manifes-
tation of it (say, ny in year y) is. ny might capture some outcome of city
government policy (call it city performance,measured along a number of di-
mensions to be discussed below) that can be partly attributed to the mayors
valence, after accounting for the underlying time-invariant traits of locality n
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(hn) and unobserved time-varying inuences on city performance (ny), as in
equation (9):
ny = (tnyn) + hn + ny (9)
After di¤erencing hn out as in equation (10), endogenous turnout can be
instrumented by cnyn :
4ny = 4(tnyn) +4ny (10)
Estimating equation (10) of course poses the same data length requirement
as equation (8).
3.2 Exogenous variation in voter turnout
As the recent research discussed in the Introduction suggests, the role of citizens
participation in shaping collective choices in representative democracies is best
understood if one can properly address the key question of the causal impact of
voter turnout on the characteristics of the candidates that are elected and on the
quality of the policies that are actually implemented. It is therefore crucial to
rely on sources of variation in voter turnout that are exogenous to the outcome
variables that we want to measure.
An ideal, though rare, opportunity to assess the causal e¤ect of voter turnout
on government performance is provided by the adoption or repeal of compulsory
voting rules. This allows to assess the e¤ects of near-universal turnout relative
to the case of sparser voluntary voting. Fowler (2013) exploits the di¤erential
adoption of compulsory voting laws across Australian state assembly elections
and employs a di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach to show that compulsory voting
caused a considerable increase in voter turnout and in the vote share of the
Labor Party. Moreover, he exploits the adoption of compulsory voting at the
national level, and nds by a synthetic control analysis comparing Australia with
a number of OECD countries that the nationwide adoption of compulsory voting
caused signicant increases in welfare spending.6 Relatedly, Funk (2010) studies
the e¤ect of a reduction in the cost of voting on voting behavior that is o¤ered
by the introduction of optional postal voting in Switzerland. She focuses on the
e¤ect of the postal voting reform on social incentives and shows that despite
the lower voting costs, electoral participation did not increase signicantly on
average and even decreased in small Swiss communities where the reduction
of the social pressure to vote plays a more important role. Complementary
evidence is o¤ered by Hodler et al. (2014) who nd that the Swiss reform was
associated with higher turnout but also with a less desirable social outcome:
a change in the composition of voters. The people who cast a ballot were on
average less educated and less informed on the political subjects they were asked
6A similar approach is employed by Ferwerda (2014) with regard to the di¤erential repeal
of compulsory voting laws in Austria.
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to express a preference on, an adverse selection that was in turn associated with
lower welfare expenditures and higher benets for special-interest groups.
Given the context of municipal elections over a relatively short time period
(a decade) that we analyze here, we cannot rely on any such dramatic change in
voting rules that might have a substantial and di¤erential impact on the cost of
voting and on the resulting level of voter turnout. In fact, the Italian municipal
election system underwent a major reform in the early 1990s, with the intro-
duction of direct election of the mayor, and remained virtually unchanged since.
However, we are able to exploit two important sources of exogenous variation
in turnout that are linked to the multi-tiered structure of local government and
to the geographical nature of our data respectively.
The rst exogenous source of variation that we exploit is of an institutional
nature, and relies on the predetermined schedule of elections that are regularly
held in Italy for representative assemblies other than municipal councils. The
existence of a multi-tiered structure of government comprising two further levels
of subnational representative assemblies (provincial and regional councils), the
national level (two chambers holding contemporaneous general elections), and
the European parliament, generates an involved schedule of recurrent elections.
Interestingly, those upper-tier elections are occasionally, though not always, held
concomitantly as some of the municipal ones. Importantly, the e¤ects of those
concomitant elections can be identied separately from nationwide year e¤ects
thanks to the fact that municipal as well as provincial and regional elections
are staggered, in the sense of taking place in di¤erent years. Moreover, even
when municipalities happen to face multiple elections in the same year, those
elections do not necessarily occur on the same days. This gives rise to a number
of overlapping electoral cycles across the national territory, including municipal
elections taking place in years where no other major elections are scheduled;7
or municipal elections taking place in the same year as other major elections,
but not on the same day; or nally municipal elections being held concomi-
tantly as nationwide European and Italian parliament elections, or regionwide
for some regional assemblies and governors. When elections for di¤erent tiers
of government are held simultaneously, voters have the chance to cast a vote
for all contesting candidates at the same polling station, thus experiencing a
substantially lower cost of casting a vote for the relatively less salient election
(presumably the municipal one) once they are at the poll to vote for the Prime
Minister or regional governor. One can therefore expect turnout to be pushed
up exogenously for mayoral elections that happen to take place in those circum-
stances, and, conditional on the time-invariant characteristics of the localities
that can conveniently be controlled for by observing elections that are repeated
over time (usually at a ve years interval), for reasons that are orthogonal to
7By major we refer to European, national and regional elections, with provincial elections
usually being much less salient and exhibiting signicantly lower voter turnout.
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the outcome variables (city performance scores and mayorsvalence indicators)
that will be later realized.
The fact that concomitant elections can have an inuence on voter turnout
rates has long been acknowledged in the political science literature. Group-
ing expectedly less salient to more salient elections has been proposed as a
potential remedy to the low level of voter turnout that is registered in the
former (especially in the US local government system) when they are held o¤-
cycle (Lijphart, 1997; Hajnal and Trounstine, 2005). However, only recently
have systematic attempts been made to precisely measure the e¤ects of hold-
ing second-order elections simultaneously as rst-order ones. Recent papers
have explored in particular the e¤ects of the election timing - on-cycle versus
o¤-cycle - both on the political outcomes of elections and on the policies that
are implemented. Anzia (2011) argues that the low voter turnout that usually
accompanies o¤-cycle elections creates a strategic opportunity for organized in-
terest groups having larger stakes in an election outcome and turning out at
high rates regardless of election timing, and being able to exert a stronger in-
uence and succeeding to obtain more favorable policies than those made by
o¢ cials elected in on-cycle elections. Using data on school district elections in
the U.S., where teacher unions are the dominant interest group, Anzia (2011)
nds that districts with o¤-cycle elections pay experienced teachers more than
districts that hold on-cycle elections. That result is conrmed by a natural
experiment created by a Texas law that forced a number of the states school
districts to move their elections to the same day as national elections (Anzia,
2012). The idea is that the change in the state law allows estimation of the
causal e¤ect of the switch to on-cycle election timing on average district teacher
salary, since teachers and their unions tend to be the dominant interest group
in school board elections. Anzia (2012) nds that school districts that were
forced to switch to on-cycle elections responded by paying lower salary raises to
teachers, supporting the hypothesis that school district representatives elected
by a larger number of residents were less responsive to the dominant interest
group after the switch. On the other hand, and while adopting a similar em-
pirical strategy, Berry and Gersen (2011) come to di¤erent conclusions. They
analyze the e¤ects of election timing on voter turnout and policy-making by
exploiting a 1980s change in the California Election Code, which allowed school
districts to change their elections from o¤-cycle to on-cycle, and estimate the
e¤ect of the resulting changes in voter turnout on a number of education policy
outcomes. Their ndings suggest that while the election timing reform indeed
produced dramatic increases in voter participation in school district elections,
the resulting changes in public policy - including teacher salaries and student
achievement tests - were modest and mostly statistically insignicant.
The second source of exogenous variation in voter turnout that we will ex-
ploit consists of weather conditions on the day municipal elections are held.
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The potential e¤ect of the weather on voter participation in elections - and on
the outcomes in those elections - has long been conjectured or postulated by
media, political practitioners, and political scientists, but it has been relatively
little studied empirically. The rst empirical work in this sense is Knack (1994).
After setting up two competing models predicting an impact from weather con-
ditions on election outcomes - one stressing the increased variance of vote shares
in low turnout contests, and the other relying on di¤erential response of party
supporters - Knack (1994) merges individual level voting data with meteoro-
logical information to conclude, somewhat surprisingly, that the e¤ects of elec-
tion day rainfall on the probability of voting and on party shares are generally
nil, and that cold temperatures are weakly positively associated with turnout
rates. Shachar and Nalebu¤ (1999) and Gatrell and Bierly (2002) nd instead
a large, negative e¤ect of election day rain on turnout in US presidential elec-
tions. Gomez et al. (2007) examine the e¤ect of estimates of rain and snow for
each US county based on GIS interpolations from a large number of weather
stations on voter turnout in US presidential elections. They nd that rain and
snow signicantly reduce voter participation, and also tend to benet the Re-
publican partys vote share. Subsequent work by Hansford and Gomez (2010)
uses rainfall as an instrument for voter turnout in US Presidential elections to
test a larger number of theoretical hypotheses concerning the predictability and
anti-incumbency tendencies of elections: they nd that higher turnout helps De-
mocratic candidates, and generally results in greater levels of electoral volatility,
while low turnout tends to validate the status quo by signicantly advantaging
the party of the incumbent president. On the other hand, Fraga and Hersch
(2010) nd that inclement weather (rain storms over half a century of presiden-
tial election days) have no substantive impact on turnout in environments that
are highly competitive.
More recent European country-level studies employing weather-related vari-
ables to explain voter turnout rates lead to mixed results too. Eisinga et al.
(2012) use data on Dutch municipal-level turnout in parliamentary elections
along with election day weather from the nearest weather stations (rainfall, tem-
perature, sunshine duration) and nd signicant and large e¤ects of weather
conditions on voting, with warm and sunny days witnessing larger turnout.
Artes (2014) uses election day rainfall data from local weather stations in Spain
as an instrument for municipal-level turnout in Spanish General Elections, and
nds that participation is lower and conservativesvote shares are higher in rainy
days. On the other hand, adverse weather conditions do not seem to have any
signicant e¤ect on electoral participation in Sweden: Persson et al. (2014) use
a number of distinct data sources (aggregate turnout data for the 290 Swedish
municipalities; individual level data from the Swedish National Election Study;
register-based surveys) to show that bad weather has no signicant e¤ect on
the likelihood of voters to turn out to vote. Finally, Lind (2014) studies the
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e¤ect of rainfall on electoral participation and political outcomes in a panel of
Norwegian municipalities, and nds that people are less willing to vote in better
weather conditions, when the opportunity cost of voting is higher. In fact, the
e¤ect of weather conditions on electoral participation seems a priori uncertain.
Adverse weather a¤ects both the cost of going to the polls - though plausibly in
a far from dramatic way in most circumstances - and the utility of performing
alternative activities over what in most countries, including Italy, is an elec-
tion weekend during Spring through Summer.8 This makes the nal e¤ect of
weather conditions in a locality on the level of voter turnout in municipal elec-
tions an empirical question, and might explain the diverse results emerged in
the literature.
3.3 Data
We use data on municipal elections in the main (provincial borough) Italian
cities through the 2000s. The sample includes 82 municipalities for which we
have data on all the variables of interest: electoral results, city performance
scores, and exogenous determinants of voter turnout (see the data Appendix for
details).
As for elections, direct mayoral elections in Italian cities take place every
fth year, with a runo¤ stage among the two most voted candidates if none gets
more than 50% of the votes in the rst stage. Voters express a preference for a
mayor candidate as well as for a councillor candidate if they wish. 60% of the
council seats are assigned to the councillor candidates belonging to the political
parties forming the coalition supporting the mayor candidate that is elected.
Voting is formally mandatory for all aged above 18, though no sanctions exist
for abstainers. The election schedule across the country is staggered, meaning
that municipal elections occurred in each of the 2001-2010 years, as shown in
table 1. Voter turnout in municipal elections, also reported in table 1, can vary
considerably across cities (from a minimum of 61.75% to a maximum of 89.43%).
In terms of city performance, we explore the e¤ect of voter turnout on indi-
cators that refer to the quality of life in the cities in terms of economic, social
and environmental aspects, and on elected representativescharacteristics that
should proxy their valence. In particular, we measure city performance by
the comprehensive index of city environmental performance that is delivered
every year by Legambiente, an independent nonprot organization, for Italian
province boroughs. The city score is based on a large number of variables in-
cluding green space availability, air quality in terms of pollutant emissions and
its consequences on human health, drinking water quality, public transporta-
tion systems, energy consumption and waste recycling performance. The score
8On the eve of a controversial popular initiative referendum in June 1991, Prime Minister
Bettino Craxi provocatively encouraged voters to head to the beaches instead of the polls.
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ranges from 0 to 100, and can be interpreted as the degree to which a city
performance approaches a feasible optimal performance. The annually released
city ranking attracts considerable media attention, fostering awareness among
citizens about the quality of their urban environment and the ability of city
governments to adequately preserve it, and the Legambiente ranking has the
advantage of implicitly constituting an assessment of the performance of local
policy-makers in managing their environmental protection tasks (Bianchini and
Revelli, 2013). Of course, urban environmental quality is not entirely under
control of municipal governments also due to possibly relevant spillovers from
nearby jurisdictions. However, given their institutional role in environmental
monitoring, regulation and protection, the impact of city governments on envi-
ronmental performance can be substantial.9
Figure 4 illustrates the pattern of performance scores and turnout rates for
the 82 cities for which we have complete data on two election waves, the rst
one taking place (due to an exogenously staggered election schedule) between
2001 and 2005, and the second one taking place ve years later, from 2006 to
2010. For each of these cities, we use the performance score that is released
three years after the election (e.g., the scores published in 2004 and 2009 for
a city holding elections in 2001 and 2006 respectively), and that uses data on
the previous two years due to Legambientes operational lags in information
gathering and elaboration of the variables constituting the performance score
(see the data Appendix for details).
The upper panel of gure 4 shows the vector of Legambiente scores assigned
between 2004 and 2008 to the cities that had elections in the years 2001 to
2005 (the rst wave of elections) against the rates of voter turnout that were
registered in those citieselections. Similarly, the lower panel of gure 4 shows
the performance scores published between 2009 and 2013 against voter turnout
in the second election wave (2006-2010). In both cross-sections, it is apparent
that turnout and city performance are negatively correlated. The OLS esti-
mate of the e¤ect of voter turnout on city performance is around  0:4 and is
statistically signicant, meaning that an increase in turnout of ten percentage
points is accompanied by 3:6 percentage points worse performance in the ear-
lier wave, and by a 4:2 percentage points worse performance in the later wave.
This negative correlation holds also in regressions that include time dummies
for the years when turnout was recorded in order to account for year-specic
nationwide inuences on local elections.10
9 In order to capture an aspect of city performance that may be argued to be more directly
under the control of the mayor, we will also use the percentage of separate waste collection in
the city (Bordignon et al., 2014).
10The results from regressions not reported indicate that governments elected in 2001-2005
achieved better performance scores on average in the rst cross-section, where the correlation
of voter turnout and city performance is only mildly signicant, a result that may depend on
several unobserved factors that simple cross-sectional regressions cannot account for.
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The negative correlation emerging from gure 4 might be due to unobserved
city characteristics that are time-invariant and are correlated both with turnout
and with urban environmental performance. Figure 5 draws the di¤erence in
performance score between the two measurement waves against the correspond-
ing di¤erence in voter turnout between the elections for each city, thus di¤er-
encing away any xed city characteristic (as in equation (10)). Again, gure 5
exhibits negative correlation between city performance and voter turnout, and
the results from a simple OLS regression on the di¤erenced data indicate that
higher turnout is accompanied by worse city performance: an increase in elec-
toral participation by ten percentage points is accompanied by an around 4
percentage points lower performance score.11 Of course, this is only suggestive
of a genuinely causal e¤ect of turnout on urban performance, an issue we turn
to in the next section.
4 Results
In order to estimate the e¤ect of voter turnout on city performance, we rst
estimate equation (10) by instrumental variables (IV), where city performance
is proxied by the environmental performance index discussed above. For each
municipality, we assign to the two election events that we observe through the
decade (the rst one during the election wave 2001-2005, and the second one
during the subsequent election wave 2006-2010, depending on the municipality-
specic election schedule) the environmental performance scores that were re-
leased on the third year following each of those elections respectively. Besides al-
lowing us to remove municipal time-invariant characteristics by rst-di¤erencing
across the two waves, this timing structure fully accounts for a substantial re-
vision in the construction procedure of the Legambiente index (basically a re-
weighting of its multiple components) that occurred between the two measure-
ment waves.
As argued above, the presence of concomitant regional, general and Euro-
pean parliament elections, as well as detailed information on weather conditions
(rainfall) on the election day, provide a set of instruments for voter turnout. Ta-
ble 2 reports data on the instruments we use, showing for each year how many
municipalities held on-cycle elections and in how many cities it was raining on
the election day. In Italy, people were called at polls three times to vote for the
national government between 2001 and 2010 (in 2001, 2006 and 2008), twice to
11There is substantial variation in the variables of interest: electoral participation has de-
creased by three percentage points on average across the two election waves (2001-05 versus
2006-10), recording a maximum decrease of 21 percentage points in Rimini and a maximum
increase by 11.5 percentage points in Pordenone; the Legambiente index has decreased a little
on average (by -0.6 points), but its change di¤ered across municipalities (its standard devia-
tion reaches almost 8 points) ranging between minus 15 points in Bergamo and plus 22 points
in Belluno.
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vote for the European parliament (in 2004 and 2009) and, if no early break-up
occurred, twice to cast a ballot for lower level elections (municipal, provincial
and regional) that take place every ve years according to a staggered election
schedule. In our sample of 164 municipal election events, national elections oc-
curred in the same day as municipal elections in 24 instances, while European
and regional elections were held concomitantly as municipal elections in 55 and
13 instances respectively. We also control for "other elections" that occurred in
11 cases when voters expressed preferences for local governments at the provin-
cial level only. As to weather conditions, the last column of table 2 shows that
on the election day it was raining in 45 cases, the dichotomous variable rain
taking value 1 if the election day was wet, zero otherwise.12
Table 3 reports rst stage estimates of IV estimation of equation (10) where
the dependent variable is the index of environmental performance. The in-
strumentsset in the rst column of the table only includes dummy variables
for concurrent upper tier elections as municipal ones. The results show that
the strongest determinant of voter turnout is the presence of the arguably most
salient national elections, which signicantly enhance voting for municipal o¢ ces
by almost nine percentage points. Instead, concomitant regional, European, and
other elections are estimated to have no signicant e¤ect on turnout.
In column (2) of table 3, we use weather conditions on the election day as the
sole instrument for voter turnout. Electoral participation is signicantly higher -
over three percentage points - in rainy election days, a result in line with Knacks
(1994) nding of a positive association of cold election day temperatures and
voter turnout. This rst stage evidence on the relationship between electoral
participation and weather conditions in Italy complements the case studies on
the e¤ect of rain on turnout cited in section 3 by suggesting that, in the Italian
case, adverse weather conditions favor turnout in municipal elections, maybe
due to the loss of alternatives that a sunny day in late Spring o¤ers. From
a statistical point of view, however, the election day weather dummy has low
explanatory power due to little variation in rainfall events in the sample (in 10
of these municipalities, weather conditions were the same in the two election
rounds we consider).
Column (3) uses the whole set of instruments: the weather indicator has
no longer a signicant e¤ect, with the concomitant national election dummy
retaining a large positive e¤ect on turnout. As the statistics at the bottom of the
table indicate, the instruments in column (3) are jointly signicant, and strong
enough to foster condence in the reliability of the second stage regressions
12Similar results can be obtained using rainfall in millimeters. The choice to use a dummy
variable is motivated by the fact that information on rain is collected from di¤erent sources
(see the data Appendix for details). While national sources provide validated data, regional
weather indicators are not, thus any data-merge would su¤er from measurement errors. More-
over, one may argue that the intensity of rainfall has di¤erent e¤ects in di¤erent areas of a
country.
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(their partial R-squared is equal to 63%).
Estimates of the second stage of the model are reported in the rst column of
table 4, using the set of instruments that includes concurrent elections dummies
and weather conditions. Interestingly, and consistently with our model, voter
turnout instrumented by the variables proxying the cost of voting is estimated
to have a negative and signicant e¤ect on city performance, with a ten per
cent increase in voter turnout being estimated to cause almost a 7 per cent
fall in the city performance score. The null hypothesis of the Hansen test of
overidentifying restrictions that all the instruments are valid is not rejected,
and the value of the Kleinberger-Paap statistic that tests for weak identication
indicates that the instruments are not weakly correlated with the endogenous
turnout variable.13
In the subsequent columns of table 4 we test the robustness of this nding
by considering other potentially relevant sources of heterogeneity across Ital-
ian municipalities. In column (2) we include a set of variables controlling for
socio-economic factors that are measured at the regional level and are arguably
exogenous to voter turnout at the municipal level. In our data the concentra-
tion index of the population living in the main cities is positively associated
with better city performance, maybe because social pressure towards partici-
pation is stronger where the population is less sparse or diverse (Funk, 2010).
The e¤ects of indicators of the demographic structure, such as the dependency
ratio (i.e., the ratio of people not in the working age to the labor force), and
the unemployment rate, are instead not precisely estimated, as is the variable
second termthat takes value 1 if the incumbent mayor wins the elections for
the second time in a row (in our sample this is the case in 54 elections), zero
otherwise.
The results in columns (3) and (4) of table 4 conrm that city performance
is decreasing in voter turnout both in the full sample and in specications where
we consider two sub-samples of Italian municipalities: in column (3) we exclude
the Italian municipalities whose population is larger than 200,000 inhabitants
as a check for the possibility that national elections, the stronger instrument
in our set, may a¤ect the choice of the candidates. This could be arguably the
case when a political party decides to choose a competent and well-known (to
the potential pool of voters) candidate at the local level to attract more votes
in the national elections, too. A choice that is more likely to be relevant in the
biggest city centers, where elections receive higher media attention. In column
(4), we exclude instead the Italian regions that are constitutionally entitled with
broader autonomy (home rule regions). Our nding of a negative impact of voter
13To foster condence in the strength of the instruments, the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F
statistic should be comparable to the critical values (in the order of 10) computed by Stock
and Yogo (2005) for the Cragg-Donald statistic it generalizes when the assumption of i.i.d.
standard errors is dropped, as in the case of robust standard errors (see Baum et al., 2007).
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turnout on city performance scores is robust in both of these sub-samples.14
Next, in column (5) we present estimates from using an alternative timing of
performance measurement. In particular, the vector of Legambiente scores that
is published in 2008 is used to measure the performance of city governments
elected during the rst wave 2001-2005, and the vector of Legambiente scores
published ve years later, in 2013, is taken as a measure of performance of
the governments elected during the second wave 2006 to 2010. This implies
that, for a performance score vector that is released in a given year y (based
on performance indicator data measured during years y   2 and y   1), the
governments that won the elections from year y  7 to year y  3, depending on
the election schedule in the various localities, are deemed responsible for the city
ratings released in year y. Table A2 in the Appendix summarizes the sequence
of events for the two waves of city performance scores that we use (2008 and
2013). The e¤ect of voter turnout on city performance turns out to be negative
when employing this specication too, although it is not statistically signicant
any longer.
Finally, in table 5 we perform the same empirical analyses of table 4 using the
component of the Legambiente index that refers to the percentage of separate
waste recycling. This narrower measure may have the advantage of capturing
a dimension of policy that is under more direct control of the elected mayor
(Bordignon et al., 2014). The results show that our main nding of a negative
and signicant e¤ect of instrumented electoral participation on policy outcomes
is robust in all specications when we use the percentage of separate waste as
dependent variable. Among the control variables, the positive and signicant
e¤ect of the second term variable on waste recycling suggests that o¢ ce duration
enhances city performance along this policy dimension.
4.1 Turnout and valence
In order to test whether voter turnout has an e¤ect on the quality of the candi-
dates that are elected, we take a number of indicators of mayorsvalence. The
main di¢ culty in dealing with valence consists in dening which characteristics
of the mayor are actually relevant and to nd good proxies for them. In prin-
ciple, mayorsvalence might refer both to the competence and to the probity
dimension of the candidates that voters consider common values. However, the
available data only allow us to build proxies of competence, due to the lack of
candidatescriminal records. In particular, we use data from the Italian Min-
istry of Interior A¤airs on individual characteristics of the elected candidates
14These results hold also when we consider only the regions in the Center-North of Italy,
thus excluding the South and the islands, where on average the Legambiente index records a
lower value.
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such as education and professional status.15
We rst exploit information on mayors education. While of course the
level of education is far from representing an ideal proxy of commonly valued
mayors valence, still holding a college degree might be viewed as a signal of
competence. We know for all mayors whether they hold a primary, secondary or
undergraduate degree, but unfortunately we have no information about the kind
of programme they attended at the undergraduate level, nor on any graduate or
post-graduate course. We therefore build a dichotomous educationvariable
taking value 1 if the mayor has a bachelor degree and zero otherwise. In our
sample, the candidates that run for the o¢ ce of mayor in the main Italian
municipalities and won hold a bachelor degree in 127 cases out of 164. The
estimation results are reported in table 6, column (1), where it appears that
the e¤ect of turnout on the probability to elect a mayor who holds a bachelor
degree is negative but not signicant at conventional levels (the p-value is 0.16).
The next three columns of table 6 use indicators of professional experience
of the elected candidates. Information on occupational status before election is
quite detailed in our dataset. We are able to identify various types of white-
collars, entrepreneurs, teachers, engineers, servicemen, lawyers, scientists, doc-
tors, directors, dealers, writers, and pensioners. To build a measure of valence
related to the profession of the mayor, we follow a classication by the Italian
Statistical Institute (ISTAT) which identies a group of professions on the basis
of the governance skills they allow to develop and then to apply. According
to that classication, the level of competence needed to dene and implement
strategies at the policy, institutional, and economic level is the one that can be
acquired by people working at high levels of government bodies, public adminis-
trations, the judicial system, the university, international organizations, public
and private companies. This way of dening high competencets well our
purpose of measuring valence, because it considers the level of knowledge re-
quired to perform specic tasks such as leading and managing public activities.
The dependent variable in the second column of table 6 is a dichotomous vari-
able that takes value 1 if the mayor was employed in one of the above mentioned
high-skilled jobs, zero otherwise. To control for endogeneity of electoral partic-
ipation, we use the vector of concurrent elections dummies and the weather
(rainfall) indicator that appear as excluded instruments in the third column of
table 3. The model we estimate is a linear probability model with xed local-
ity e¤ects.16 The IV estimation results in column (2) of table 6 indicate that
15We also experimented with a number of mayor candidatescharacteristics including age
and gender, none of which, though, turn out to be signicantly a¤ected by the rate of voter
turnout (results available on request).
16Despite the arguments against the use of linear probability models with binary dependent
variables, there is consensus in the literature about considering them preferable to non-linear
models when working with panel data and instrumental variables. In those cases, logit and
probits outcomes should be indeed converted into marginal e¤ects that would become di¢ cult
to deal with both for computational and interpretational reasons (for a discussion see Angrist
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turnout has a negative impact on the probability that high professional sta-
tusmayors are elected, thus conrming that where participation is low due
to high costs of voting, it is more likely to elect a competent candidate. This
nding holds in column (3), where we consider a more restrictive denition of
such profession-related valence that does not include entrepreneurs, who may
be argued to have a conict of interest as public administrators. Finally, the
same result emerges in the last column of table 6 too, where the group of high
competence candidates is enlarged to include the mayors that were classied as
persons having ceased to workat the time of the election.
5 Concluding remarks
Being generally viewed as a symptom of democratic decit and a cause of biased
policy choices, low voter turnout tends to be a reason for widespread concern.
This paper has addressed the question of whether low voter turnout rates in
local elections can really be deemed responsible for poor selection of candidates
and weak performance of cities, and whether institutional remedies aimed at
raising votersparticipation in local elections should be considered, also in the
light of the growing socio-economic role of cities and their potential impact on
peoples lives.
We have rst built a model of voluntary and costly expressive voting, where
the relative weight of ideology and valence issues over voting costs determines
how people vote, and if they actually turn out to vote. The model indeed
predicts, in line with the conventional rational calculus approach, that the cost of
voting depresses voter turnout. However, it also shows that high voting cost/low
turnout elections tend to be characterized by a large share of voters for whom
the common value signal on candidatesvalence (competence or probity traits
that are valued by the whole electorate) matches their private value views. This
implies that higher voting costs can in fact raise the chances of selecting more
valent candidates, and lead to the implementation of more successful policies.
We have tested the model on Italian municipalitieselection data, where we
have exploited exogenous variation in voter turnout rates through the 2000s
arising from two distinct sources. The rst is the presence, that is typical of
multi-tiered structures of government, of recurrent overlapping election cycles
generating the possibility of concomitant elections for other levels of government
(regional, national and European parliament elections) raising the stakes and
reducing the cost of casting a vote for a second-order (municipal) election. The
second is the long referred to, but relatively little systematically studied, turnout
e¤ect of weather conditions (rainfall) on the election day.
Measuring city performance by a unique indicator of urban environmental
quality, and proxying mayors valence by variables reecting their education,
and Pischke, 2009).
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competence, and professional experience, the instrumental variables estimation
results consistently point to a negative causal impact of voter turnout rates on
the performance of cities and on the professional dimension of mayorsvalence
indicators, thus suggesting that a switch from low to high voter turnout that
would be favored by a decline in voting costs might not always be benecial in
terms of candidate selection.
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Data Appendix
The sample compiled for the paper includes 82 municipalities for which we
were able to collect data on all the variables relevant to our analysis in both
cross-sections: electoral variables, city performance, weather conditions. Data
on electoral outcomes and mayors characteristics in Italian municipalities are
from the Ministry of Internal A¤airs. The cities in the sample are the main
municipalities (and administrative centers) in the province boroughs they belong
to. Data refer to rst-round election outcomes between 2001 and 2010. We
consider two 5-year non overlapping cross-sections (2001-2005 and 2006-2010).
If we observe more than one observation in a cross-section, due to an early
break-up of the local government, we keep the more recent one. In the sample,
elections took place every ve years in 68 municipalities, while 14 municipalities
held elections before the natural end of the term of o¢ ce. The online archive of
the Italian Ministry does not include complete data for elections in autonomous
regions. Our sample includes Sardegna and Friuli - Venezia Giulia, and not
Sicilia (where up to year 2005, elections were held in the Fall and only thereafter
in the Spring/early Summer as in the other regions), and the two bilinguistic
regions Valle dAosta and Trentino Alto Adige. The ordinary region Calabria
is not included due to its high political instability.
Data on city performance are collected by Legambiente, an Italian nonprot
organization that yearly publishes a report, entitled Ecosistema Urbano, on
the environmental quality of the main Italian municipalities. In our main spec-
ications, we use the Legambiente score released three years after the elections
we focus on took place. Since the score published at the end of each year gath-
ers information on city performance in the previous two years, this means that,
for instance, to measure the performance of a local government that won the
elections in 2010 we use the score released in November 2013 that measures city
performance in 2012 (and considers 2011 data to ll missing values in a few
sub-categories of the index only).
The main source of information on weather conditions is the Italian Weather
Archive online (Archivio Meteo Italia). Where not available in the main
online database, data were provided by the weather service and forecast of-
ces of the regional agencies for environmental protection (Agenzia Regionale
per la Protezione dellAmbiente, ARPA). We gratefully acknowledge ARPA
Piemonte, ARPA Lombardia, Regione Abruzzo - Direzione LL.PP e Protezione
Civile, ARPA Veneto, Regione Umbria - Idrograco Regionale, for their assis-
tance.
Control variables are from the Italian Statistical Institute (ISTAT ). The
concentration index of the population living in big cities, the dependency ratio,
and the unemployment rate are measured at the regional level. Our main results
would not change if we used the concentration index and the dependency ratio
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at the provincial level, while the unemployment rate is only available for 2002-
2011 at the regional level (for municipalities who had elections in 200, we used
the 2002 observations), because a change in the compilation strategy does not
allow to use data at the provincial level.
Table A1 Descriptive statistics
Variable Observations mean std. dev. min max
Voter turnout 164 76.58 5.39 61.75 89.43
Legambiente index, 2 years after 164 51.57 7.66 29.98 73.71
Legambiente index, in 2008 and 2013 164 51.40 8.83 25.40 74.63
Waste recycling, 2 years after 164 31.92 16.10 1.00 72.10
Waste recycling, in 2008 and 2013 164 36.29 17.38 3.70 79.00
Concentration index, regional 164 46.43 25.38 22.67 121.40
Dependecy ratio, regional 164 51.50 3.58 42.50 61.60
Unemployment rate, regional 164 6.55 3.43 2.54 17.57
Second term 164 0.33 0.47 0 1
Length of o¢ ce 164 3.15 1.35 1 5
Education, BA degree 164 0.77 0.42 0 1
Profession, high competence 164 0.20 0.40 0 1
Profession, less entrepreneurs 164 0.14 0.35 0 1
Profession, plus retired 164 0.24 0.43 0 1
Table A2 Schedule of events
elections performance
measurement
First observation wave
2001 2006 - 2007 ! 2008
2002 2006 - 2007 ! 2008
2003 2006 - 2007 ! 2008
2004 2006 - 2007 ! 2008
2005 2006 - 2007 ! 2008
Second observation wave
2006 2011 - 2012 ! 2013
2007 2011 - 2012 ! 2013
2008 2011 - 2012 ! 2013
2009 2011 - 2012 ! 2013
2010 2011 - 2012 ! 2013
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Table 1 Election data: 2001-2010
Elections Turnout
Year number mean st.dev. min max
2001 18 81.25 7.21 64.18 89.43
2002 21 76.65 5.35 67.25 84.51
2003 8 73.86 3.88 69.11 78.87
2004 27 78.61 2.70 72.85 82.32
2005 8 76.66 2.55 72.04 80.97
2006 17 73.33 6.33 64.74 85.16
2007 20 74.06 6.30 61.75 83.96
2008 9 80.53 3.75 73.66 85.86
2009 28 75.84 2.66 69.83 82.21
2010 8 72.97 3.92 67.98 80.25
Table 2 Concurrent elections and rainy days
Year European National Regional Provincial Other Rainy
elections elections elections elections elections day
2001 0 16 0 2 1 1
2002 0 0 0 3 3 10
2003 0 0 0 1 1 0
2004 27 0 0 22 0 2
2005 0 0 7 1 1 0
2006 0 0 0 1 1 1
2007 0 0 0 3 3 15
2008 0 8 0 2 0 7
2009 28 0 0 19 0 11
2010 0 0 6 1 1 0
Notes: Elections at the provincial level were held concurrently with municipal
elections in 56 instances. The "other elections" dummy variable that we use in the re-
gressions takes value zero when concurrent municipal and provincial elections occurred
on the same day as higher-level (European, national or regional) election, too.
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Table 3 Voter turnout and city performance, rst stage, IV-FD estimation
Dependent variable: Voter turnout
Column: (1) (2) (3)
National elections 8.941*** 8.948***
(1.160) (1.186)
European elections 0.316 0.317
(1.601) (1.617)
Regional elections 0.722 0.721
(1.024) (1.036)
Other elections -5.738 -5.739
(3.779) (3.799)
Rain 3.065** -0.020
(1.254) (0.663)
Statistics:
Partial R-squared 0.630 0.064 0.630
F statistic 21.11 5.97 16.78
[0.00] [0.02] [0.00]
Municipalities 82 82 82
Notes: Estimation method: IV - rst di¤erences estimation. Robust standard
errors in parenthesis, (*) (**) (***) denote signicance at the (10) (5) (1) percent
level. Statistics computed by the ivreg2 Stata module (Baum et al., 2007), denitions:
Partial R-squared of excluded instruments; F statistic of the joint signicance of the
instruments, p-values in square brackets.
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Table 4 Voter turnout and city performance, second stage, IV-FD estimation
Dependent variable: Legambiente index
Sample: All All No big Ordinary All
cities regions
Column: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Voter turnout -0.676*** -0.630*** -0.724*** -0.738*** -0.057
(0.157) (0.160) (0.181) (0.158) (0.192)
Concentration 0.482* 0.502* -0.554 0.293
(0.251) (0.278) (0.572) (0.318)
Dependency ratio 0.265 0.115 -0.329 -0.358
(0.613) (0.691) (0.585) (0.525)
Unemployment rate -0.371 -0.246 0.113 1.391***
(0.496) (0.531) (0.487) (0.534)
Second term 0.372 0.392 -0.256 0.424
(0.933) (1.057) (0.863) (0.914)
Length of o¢ ce -1.613**
(0.671)
Statistics:
Hansens J statistic 4.023 4.217 3.960 4.406 2.973
[0.403] [0.377] [0.411] [0.354] [0.562]
Weak identif. test 16.78 16.43 16.34 16.69 16.18
Municipalities 82 82 70 75 82
Notes: Estimation method: IV (rst di¤erences) estimation. Robust standard
errors in parenthesis; (*) (**) (***) denote signicance at the (10) (5) (1) percent
level. Statistics computed by the ivreg2 Stata module (Baum et al., 2007), deni-
tions: Hansens J statistic of over-identifying restrictions, under the null that all the
excluded instruments are valid instruments, Chi-squared p-values in square brackets;
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic of weak identication. The instrumentsset in-
cludes the variables listed in the third column of Table 3 in columns (1) to (4) and (5).
In column (5) the dependent variable is measured according to the timing presented
in Table A2.
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Table 5 Voter turnout and city performance, second stage, IV-FD estimation
Dependent variable: Waste recycling
Sample: All All No big Ordinary All
cities regions
Column: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Voter turnout -0.688** -0.630** -0.763** -0.774*** -0.516*
(0.279) (0.280) (0.311) (0.299) (0.285)
Concentration 0.356 0.215 -1.551 0.391
(0.652) (0.704) (1.155) (0.682)
Dependency ratio -0.673 -0.708 -1.687 -3.522***
(1.095) (1.174) (1.085) (1.199)
Unemployment rate -0.205 -0.356 0.971 0.199
(1.095) (1.217) (0.943) (1.174)
Second term 2.781* 3.747** 2.692* 1.058
(1.628) (1.863) (1.571) (1.874)
Length of o¢ ce -1.301
(1.366)
Statistics:
Hansens J statistic 5.226 6.504 4.578 4.558 2.134
[0.265] [0.165] [0.333] [0.336] [0.711]
Weak identif. test 16.78 16.43 16.34 16.69 16.18
Municipalities 82 82 70 75 82
Notes: Estimation method: IV (rst di¤erences) estimation. Robust standard
errors in parenthesis; (*) (**) (***) denote signicance at the (10) (5) (1) percent
level. Statistics computed by the ivreg2 Stata module (Baum et al., 2007), deni-
tions: Hansens J statistic of over-identifying restrictions, under the null that all the
excluded instruments are valid instruments, Chi-squared p-values in square brackets;
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic of weak identication. The instrumentsset in-
cludes the variables listed in the third column of Table 3 in columns (1) to (4) and (5).
In column (5) the dependent variable is measured according to the timing presented
in Table A2.
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Table 6 Voter turnout and valence, IV-FD estimation
Dep. var.: Education Profession Profession Profession
(BA) (high competence) (no entrepreneurs) (including retired)
Column: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Voter turnout -0.008 -0.018** -0.019** -0.026**
(0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011)
Concentration 0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.022
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.012)
Dependency 0.041 0.012 0.019 -0.026
(0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.041)
Unemployment 0.009 -0.003 -0.003 0.010
(0.027) (0.031) (0.030) (0.037)
Second term -0.043 -0.033 0.003 0.016
(0.039) (0.047) (0.039) (0.057)
Statistics:
Hansens J stat. 4.019 6.788 4.260 4.678
[0.403] [0.148] [0.372] [0.322]
Weak ident. test 16.43 16.43 16.43 16.43
Municipalities 82 82 82 82
Notes: Estimation method: IV - rst di¤erences estimation. Robust standard
errors in parenthesis, (*) (**) (***) denote signicance at the (10) (5) (1) percent
level. Statistics computed by the ivreg2 Stata module (Baum et al., 2007), deni-
tions: Hansens J statistic of over-identifying restrictions, under the null that all the
excluded instruments are valid instruments, Chi-squared p-values in square brackets;
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic of weak identication.
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